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I. INTRODUCTION 1
A butterfly flapped its wings in Colorado and Texas felt the breeze.
Republicans and Democrats in both Colorado and Texas found them-
selves in the middle of a redistricting battle over new congressional maps.
On one side, the Colorado Democrats opposed the new map, contending
it violated the Colorado Constitution.2 According to the Democrats, the
Constitution prohibited redrawing any map unless it was redrawn after
each census and before general elections.' Democrats further argued
that the judiciary overstepped its bounds because a district judge drew
the map in dispute.' On the other side, Republicans contended that the
new map was only a temporary remedy and Colorado's legislative body,
the General Assembly, would complete the official redistricting.' The
Colorado Supreme Court, however, rejected the Republicans' arguments
in a decision that has national effects.
The ruling is a coup for Colorado Democrats, as they will gain two of
the five seats controlled by Republicans.6 Additionally, the decision will
aid Democrats on a national level because the party is fighting to gain
twelve additional seats in the House of Representatives.7 Colorado
Democrats are counting on the same to result in Texas. The Colorado
Supreme Court, however, had an answer within its own constitution,
which prohibited mid-centennial redistricting.' Texas, on the other hand,
1. The subject of minority aggregation under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act is not
new. Its current importance derives from the Supreme Court's decision in Shaw v. Reno,
509 U.S. 630 (1993). Shaw, discussed later in this comment, was decided under the same
political circumstances that Texas faced at the start of 2004-a period in which Republicans
were once again poised to take control of both the House of Representatives and the
Senate. See Timothy G. O'Rourke, Shaw v. Reno: The Shape of Things to Come, 26
RUTGERS L.J. 723, 726 ("The concentration of predominately Democratic African
American and Hispanic voters in majority-minority districts tends to place more
Republicans in surrounding districts.").
2. Colorado Court Rules Redistricting Unconstitutional, DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
Dec. 1, 2003, available at http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dallas/nation/stories/12
0103dnnatredistricting.5c8ada39.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2004).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. Seven of the twelve seats Democrats are pushing for will come out of Texas if
the Republican-backed remap is overturned. Id.
8. Colorado Court Rules Redistricting Unconstitutional, supra note 2. COLO.
CONST. art. V § 44 states:
The General Assembly shall divide the state into as many congressional districts as
there are representatives in congress apportioned to this state by the congress of the
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is standing on the threshold of a history-making event. Its redistricting
battle could force the Supreme Court to make a definitive decision on
whether minority-voting may be combined for purposes of drawing con-
gressional lines.9
For their part, Texas Democrats face a huge obstacle. Unlike Colo-
rado, no State constitutional provision exists that denies the legislature
the right to remap more than once between decennial censuses. Thus,
Texas Republicans and Democrats have to fight their battle using argu-
ments centered on racial and political gerrymandering."0 Accordingly,
each party will have to plead its case using the same case precedents.
Redistricting is both racial and political, 1 and has the potential to frac-
ture minority votes. Texas' fight over redrawing congressional districts is
ripe to come before the United States Supreme Court and carries the
possibility of reshaping future redistricting. This fight also has the poten-
tial to put minority voters in a position of power. Minority voters do not
have to wait about the periphery as others decide how best to use their
voting power-regardless of how a potential Supreme Court battle be-
tween Texas Republicans and Democrats ends. In the past, the minority
vote was important for the purposes of vote dilution claims under the
Voting Rights Act (VRA). 2 Growth of the Hispanic population in the
United States, however, calls for minorities to use the provisions of the
VRA not as a claim for vote dilution, but as a political tool to aggregate
United States for the election of one representative to congress from each district.
When a new apportionment shall be made by congress, the general assembly shall
divide the state into congressional districts accordingly.
Salazar v. Davidson, No. 03SA133 & No. 03SA147 (Colo. Dec. 1, 2003) (en banc), http://
www.cobar.org/opinions/opinion.cfmopinionlD=3975 (last visited Oct. 30, 2004). In an
advance opinion consolidating two cases, the Colorado Supreme Court reasoned that the
constitutional provision places a restriction on redistricting saying, "[A] new apportion-
ment is a 'condition' for redistricting ... [and] redistricting must take place after and only
after a census." Id. (emphasis added).
9. See Aylon M. Schulte, Note, Minority Aggregation Under Section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act: Toward Just Representation in Ethnically Diverse Communities, 1995 U. Ill. L.
REV. 441, 442 (1995) (discussing the Supreme Court's refusal to address minority
aggregation).
10. Pete Slover, Remap Trial Won't Linger, but Outcome Could. DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, Dec. 8, 2003, available at http://www.dallasnews.com/s/dallas/tsw/stories/120803
dntexremap.lbaed.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2004).
11. Sebastian Geraci, Comment, The Case Against Allowing Multicultural Coalitions
to File Section 2 Dilution Clains, 1995 U. Ci-. LEGAL F. 389, 389 (1995).
12. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-l (1988 & Supp. V (1993)) (2003).
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groups protected under the VRA and use the political combination to
gain representation within their districts.'
3
Redistricting is an extremely complex topic that involves statutes, poli-
ticking, and limitless number-crunching. Thus, the focus of this comment
is to address the issue of future Hispanic and African-American politics. 4
Specifically, how will redistricting affect the future of minority politics in
Texas? In sum, this comment recommends that Hispanics and African-
Americans take advantage of the new redistricting war and manipulate it
for the benefit of minority-rich districts.
Part II reviews the relatively brief history surrounding majority-minor-
ity districts, the external threat that they face, and the cases that have
affected redistricting outcomes.
Part III explains the current agenda of Texas Republicans and Demo-
crats and the importance of catering to majority-minority districts. It
notes the possible legal stances each party might take in light of the his-
tory of redistricting when race is a factor. Part III also addresses how
Hispanics and African-Americans can use minority coalitions and unpre-
dictable voting as control measures against majoritorian manipulation.
Finally, Part IV concludes that, regardless of the legal approach
presented by the Republicans and Democrats, and the internal matters
concerning Hispanics and African-Americans, a decision by the Supreme
Court will prove to be monumental to future redistricting efforts. 15 Once
again, "the lines being drawn mark the boundaries of voting districts, and
the weapon of choice is the Voting Rights Act."'
' 6
II. SECTION 2 OF THE VOTING RIGHTS AcT OF 1965
In 1965, Congress passed the VRA to eradicate the use of literacy tests
and other devices that hindered African-Americans from exercising their
right to vote under the Fifteenth Amendment. 7 Congress extended the
13. Schulte, supra note 9, at 442 (discussing how the VRA was originally intended for
African-Americans, but its failure to directly address minority aggregation allows for the
interpretation that minority groups may combine in order to oppose vote dilution).
14. This comment focuses on the two largest minorities in America today. It seeks in
no way to diminish the importance of other minorities.
15. As of this printing, the U.S. Supreme Court ordered the "controversial congres-
sional map passed by the Texas Legislature" to be reviewed by an East Texas district court
to determine whether "partisan politics played and excessive role." Supreme Court Rules
On Redistricting Case, available at http://www.kxan.com/Global/story.asp? S=2445023 (last
visited Oct. 30, 2004).
16. Schulte, supra note 9, at 442.
17. 2 MARSHA J. TYSON DARLING, RACE, VOTING, REDISTRICTING AND THE CONSTI-
TUTION: ENFORCING AND CHALLENGING TIE VOTING RIG's ACr of 1965 246 (2001);
KEITH J. BYBEE, MISTAKEN IDENTITY: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE POLITICS of MI-
NORITY REPRESENTATION 15 (1998).
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scope of the VRA in 1975 to include other minorities, such as Hispanics.
In 1982, Congress made a significant alteration to Section 2 of the VRA.
The new language "prohibit[ed] any State practice 'which result[ed] in'
members of a racial or language minority having 'less opportunity than
other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and
to elect representatives of their choice.'"' 8 Thus, the 1982 amendment
completely altered the focus of the Act.
A. Movement From "Intent Test" to "Effects Test"
Prior to the 1982 modification, Section 2 had focused on the intent be-
hind the creation of districts. Thereafter, the focus was on the effects of
minority representation within new districts. 19 The "effects test," unlike
the "intent test," did not require proof of discriminatory intent to estab-
lish a Section 2 violation.20
The intent test arose from the Supreme Court's decision in Mobile v.
Bolden.21 The plaintiffs in Bolden alleged that the multimember voting
system unfairly diluted the voting power of the African-American citizens
under Section 2 of the VRA.22 Multimember districts were generally dis-
tricts in which the same voters elected multiple representatives to serve
one physical area.23 The same area could be divided into several districts,
each with its own representatives. 24 Many viewed the multimember dis-
trict as another device to thwart the African-American vote.25
Before Bolden, it was believed that Section 2 could be violated simply
by showing that it had been possible to elect a minority candidate. 26 As
the Plaintiffs in Bolden contended, intent was unnecessary because the
minority population's candidate of choice would hardly ever win an elec-
tion due to the majority-dominated vote.2 7 However, the Court dis-
agreed, reasoning that the voting practice was conducted in such a way as
to not rely on race because the intent behind the redistricting had been
facially neutral.28 Further, according to the Court, "[A] jurisdiction such
18. DARLING, sUpra note 17, at 352.
19. Id. at 300.
20. Id. at 353.
21. See generally Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
22. DARLING, supra note 17, at 249.
23. George Bundy Smith, The Multimember District: A Study of the Multimember Dis-
trict and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 66 ALB. L. REV. 11, 11 (2002).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 20.
27. Smith, supra note 23, at 12; accord Cynthia Kurz, Note, Shaw v. Reno: Defining the
Constitutional Parameters of Racial Reapportionment, 1994 DET. C.L. REV. 239,248 (1994).
28. DARILING, supra note 17, at 250.
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as Mobile, Alabama, though possessed of a significant minority popula-
tion, could not be found to have violated the Fourteenth or Fifteenth
Amendment (or Section 2) unless its election machinery, including the
procedures which accompanied it, were conceived or operated with a dis-
criminatory intent or purpose. 29
History had proven, however, that multimember districts had been
used to dilute the minority votes. 3° Thus, the legislative reaction to
Bolden resulted in Congress spending two years revising the language of
Section 2 of the VRA,3" which ultimately produced the 1982 change.
Motivated by that change, state and local legislatures began to create
single-member districts. Single-member districting allows a district to be
split into smaller sections so that the candidate elected is likely to be the
candidate of choice for the voters within the district.3 2 Moreover, these
single-member districts provide a safe harbor for states under Section 2 of
the VRA.3 3
The most widely implemented single-member district, however, was
safe-districting, or "majority-minority districting," which focused prima-
rily on minority representation. 34 In an at-large system, a single district
can elect more than one representative.3 ' Nonetheless, in a district that is
predominately White, a minority candidate is almost never elected. 36
"The [Supreme] Court's eventual solution to this problem was to invali-
date at-large districts as 'diluting' minority votes and to replace them with
single-member districting plans that give minority voters a majority in
one or more districts." 37
29. DARLING, supra note 17, at 249; accord Smith, supra note 23, at 20.
30. Smith, supra note 23, at 12-13.
31. See generally DARLING, supra note 17 (discussing the first proposed amendment to
the language of Section 2 in 1980 until the passing of the much compromised proposal in
1982).
32. Note, Alternative Voting Systems as Remedies for Unlawful At-Large Systems, 92
YALE L.J. 144, 145 n.ll (1982) [hereinafter Alternative Voting Systems].
33. Race-neutral districting, for example, is a type of single-member redistricting in
which special masters divide the at-large system into single-member districts and race is not
taken into account. Id. at 145. But see James F. Blumstein, Racial Gerrymandering and
Vote Dilation: Shaw v. Reno in Doctrinal Context, 26 RUTGERS L. J. 517, 519 (discussing
Justice Souter's dissent in Shaw in which he stated that the use of race cannot be circum-
vented in the districting process).
34. Alternative Voting Systems, supra note 32, at 146.
35. Heather K. Gerken, Understanding the Right to an Undiluted Vote, 114 HARV. L.
Riuv. 1663, 1672 (2001).
36. Id. at 1673.
37. Id.
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B. Majority-Minority Districting
Majority-minority redistricting "ensure[s] that the minority groups
achiev[e] an effective electoral majority in single-member districts.""
The main purpose of the majority-minority districts was to protect "Afri-
can-Americans and particularly 'language minorities' . . . from districting
arrangements that systematically dilute voting strength."3 9 A majority-
minority district, however, is not automatically created because a minor-
ity group claims to have been discriminated against in the voting process.
Plaintiffs claiming vote dilution per Section 2 of the VRA must pass the
three-prong test set out in the Supreme Court case, Thornburg v. Gin-
gles.4" The three-prong test requires 1) "a [multimember] electoral sys-
tem [that] diluted the minority vote; 2) [the] minority group was
politically cohesive, sufficiently large, and geographically compact to
form a majority in a single-member district; and 3) [the minority group]
was opposed by a White-majority voting bloc often enough that the mi-
nority-preferred candidate usually lost."'" State legislatures responded to
Gingles by drawing majority-minority districts before a minority group
could bring suit under Section 2 of the VRA.42 The trend continued well
into the early 1990s, making it necessary to rearrange other districts
where this had not been the case.43
Unfortunately, majority-minority districting plans were not always ef-
fective. Legislatures could still draw district lines that allowed White con-
stituents to be the majority.44 Newly drawn district lines either "packed"
minorities into a district or "fractured" minorities so that their combined
38. Alternative Voting Systems, supra note 32, at 146.
39. Steve Bickerstaff, Effects of the Voting Rights Act on Reapportionment and His-
panic Voting Strength in Texas, 6 TEx. HisP'. J.L. & POL'Y 99, 102 (2001); Theane Evangelis,
Note, The Constitutionality of Compensating for Low Minority Voter Turnout in Districting,
77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 796, 797 (2002).
40. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50-51 (1986); accord Geraci, supra note 11
(supporting belief that the use of minority aggregation to meet Gingles requirement would
cause unwanted consequences); cf. Christopher E. Skinnell, Comment, Why Courts Should
Forbid "Minority Coalition" Plaintiffs Under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act Absent
Clear Congressional Authorization, 2002 U. Cn. LEGAL F. 363 (2002) (arguing that the
first prong of Gingles was created to prevent mandatory proportional representation and
still allow vote dilution claims).
41. BYBEE, supra note 17, at 25 (referring to the three prongs set out in Gingles that
established how to determine if a minority vote had been unfairly diluted).
42. MARK E. Rusti & RICHARD L. ENGSTROM, FAIR AN!) EFFECI'IVE REPRESENTA-
TION?: DEBATING EILECTORAi REFORM AND MINORITY RIGITS tO (2001).
43. Id.
44. Gerken, supra note 35, at 1674.
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votes were ineffective.45 Thus, the trend led to the creation of minority
coalitions in order to meet the second Gingles requirement.
C. Safety In Numbers: Use of Minority Aggregation to Meet
Requirements of Gingles
Minority coalitions are generally created to meet the first and second
requirements of the three-prong Gingles test: political cohesiveness and
sufficiently large and geographically compact.46 Minorities aggregate
their district numbers with another minority within the same multimem-
ber district and bring the case as one plaintiff. Aggregation is a powerful
political tool that has been successful in the past. The cases of League of
United Latin American Citizens v. Clements ("LULAC IH")4" and Cam-
pos v. Baytown48 are two of the leading aggregation cases that came out
of the Fifth Circuit.
49
LULAC III, the culmination of two other cases, LULAC I50 and LU-
LAC I51, involved the aggregation of African-Americans and Hispanics
in West Texas. The case, and its predecessors, focused on the dilution of
the minority vote in local school board elections. Opponents claimed
that aggregation went against the purpose of Section 2 of the VRA and
that groups had mutually exclusive interests.5 2 The court further stated
that the aggregation of the African-Americans and Hispanics satisfied the
first prong of the Gingles factors because the groups' goals were compati-
ble.53 The Fifth Circuit reasoned that both groups shared common past
discrimination and had identical political goals. However, the court
never addressed whether this aggregation violated Section 2 of the
VRA.54
45. Id. at 35, at 1675.
46. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 89-90.
47. 986 F.2d 728 (5th Cir. 1993).
48. Campos v. City of Baytown, 840 F.2d 1240 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S.
905 (1989) (discussing Baytown's violation of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 by caus-
ing dilution of the minority vote). Contra Nixon v. Kent County, 76 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir.
1996) (refusing to allow aggregation because it did not support the purpose of the VRA).
49. Geraci, supra note I1, at 396-97; accord Schulte, supra note 9, at 443 (noting that
the Fifth Circuit decided the first cases that allowed for minority aggregation).
50. League of United Latin Am. Citizens, Council 4386 v. Midland Indep. Sch. Dist.,
812 F.2d 1494 (5th Cir. 1987) ("LULAC I") (agreeing that African-Americans and Hispan-
ics may combine to form one cohesive entity under the VRA).
51. League of United Latin Am. Citizens, Council No. 4384 v. Clements, 986 F.2d 620
(5th Cir. 1990) (Jones, J., concurring) ("LULAC i1").
52. Geraci, supra note 11, at 396.
53. Id.
54. See id., at 396-97 (citing League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Clements, 986
F.2d 728 (5th Cir. 1993)) ("LULAC fir').
I[Vol. 7:71
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The Baytown case furthered the Fifth Circuit's rationale in LULAC 1.5
The Baytown court reasoned that Section 2 of the VRA did not specifi-
cally prohibit aggregation and that neither African-Americans nor His-
panics qualified separately as a majority-minority district. Therefore, it
was unlikely that any minority would be able to elect a representative.
56
Thus, Baytown was in agreement with the LULAC decisions in that it was
permissible to aggregate in order to meet the Gingles requirements. But,
the victory in Baytown left the question open as to whether two minority
groups could "aggregate themselves into one substantial minority coali-
tion for purposes of challenging voting systems and practices under Sec-
tion 2 of the VRA."
57
D. Opposition to Minority Coalitions
Opposition to minority coalitions presents several viable arguments.
First, the creation of minority coalitions to meet the Gingles' require-
ments would create undesirable consequences such as coalitions becom-
ing a redistricting "sword" that can be manipulated by both opponents
and proponents of majority-minority districts. 58 An opponent would
likely claim that not enough minorities are represented individually to
require a majority-minority district. In contrast, a proponent would ar-
gue that enough minorities exist to create one cohesive majority-minority
district. Either position may dominate a congressional floor depending
on the needs of the legislative body.
Second, the consequence of minority coalitions is that it would not
"provide[] states and municipalities [a] reliable means of structuring
their voting systems to avoid either lawsuits or liability."' 59 Currently,
under Section 2 and the Gingles criteria, legislators have at least some
guidelines to follow to prevent a Section 2 challenge. But with minority
coalitions, the chances of warding off all possible claims is extremely low
because the legislature cannot discern which minorities might aggregate
and how that aggregation would affect the voting outcome of another
minority group within a district.6° The uncertainty leaves open too many
doors not only for Section 2 claims, but also for administrative failure.61
55. See Baytown, 840 F.2d 1240.
56. Id. at 1242.
57. Skinnell, supra note 40, at 363. Predictably, the Supreme Court offered little help
when it stated that it refused to decide whether minority coalitions were constitutional. Id.
58. Id. at 372 (construing LULAC 1, 812 F.2d at 1504 (1986) (Higginbotham, J.,
dissenting)).
59. Id. 385.
60. See id. at 387 (discussing how conflict increases as the number of possible plaintiffs
increases).
61. Id.
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A third unwanted consequence of aggregation is "the bad faith ac-
tor.",62 Corrupt jurisdictions could use aggregation as a way "to defend
themselves from challenges by a single minority group. ' 63 "In other
words, if blacks or Hispanics challenged a voting practice or system,
would proponents of aggregation be willing to accept as a defense the
claim that 'minorities' constituted majorities in enough districts that the
individual group has no cause to complain?"'
A final argument against the use of aggregation to meet the Gingles
criteria is that, under Section 2, aggregation crosses the line between pro-
tection of minorities and the mandating of proportional representation.6 5
Section 2 prohibits requiring proportional representation.6 6 Essentially,
minority groups could evade the Gingles requirement by never actually
having to prove the requirements because no one group would have to
singularly qualify.
67
E. Force of Nature: The Constitutional Challenge to Majority-Minority
Districts
One of the things that was going on in the 1990[s] litigation was the
notion of reverse discrimination in redistricting. This idea reflects a
belief that the minority community has gained enough power.., and
if you draw affirmatively minority districts then you will violate the
U.S. Constitution. This notion has persisted regardless.., of the fact
that every other political interest group has nothing that keeps it
from leveraging its clout with the legislature to draw benefits on its
behalf. . . . [T]he redistricting process and the litigation process in
the 1990s involved trying to hold onto your gains and not losing
anything.68
62. Skinnell, supra note 40, at 388. Contra Schulte, supra note 9, at 466 (arguing that
claims presented by an aggregated minority group should be decided on a case-by-case
basis, including political cohesiveness).
63. Skinnell, supra note 40, at 388.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (2003) ("[N]othing in this section establishes a right to have
members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the popula-
tion."); accord Skinnell, supra note 40, at 388.
67. See Skinnell, supra note 40, at 389 (contending that, even if minorities came to-
gether to form one cohesive group, courts would be unable to determine if the coalition
was permanent or just temporary until both groups' needs were met).
68. Symposium, Drawing lines in the Sand: The Texas Latino Community and Redis-
tricting 2001, 6 TEX. HisP. J.L. & POL'Y 1, 10 (2001); see also MAURICE T. CUNNINGHAM,
MAXIMIZATION WHATEVER THE COST: RACE, REDISTRICTING, AND THE DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE 94-5 (2001) (discussing civil rights interest groups and their political agendas).
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The creation of majority-minority districts meant that a greater number
of legislative seats, whether local or State, were available to minorities."
The result of creating new minority seats was the loss of White liberal
representation."v The backlash of these majority-minority districts came
in the form of White allegations of racial gerrymandering."' Generally,
"gerrymandering refers to discriminatory districting which operates un-
fairly to inflate the political strength of one group and deflate that of
another."72 In the case of racial gerrymandering, White voters claimed
that African-Americans and Hispanics were using the drawing of new
majority-minority districts as another affirmative action quota system,
and this in turn diluted their right to vote.7 3 The main contentions raised
by White complainants were that the new district plans were oddly-
shaped and that they were derived from non-traditional district criteria. 4
The traditional district criteria identified by the Supreme Court are "con-
tiguity, compactness, respect for political subdivisions, and recognition of
communities of interest.
' 75
69. RUSH & ENGSTROM, supra note 42, at xii-xiii.
70. Id. at xiii.
71. Id. at 4.
72. Id.
73. Id. at xiii.
74. Id. at 4; cf. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S 339, 347 (1990) (arguing that the
twenty-eight-sided district shape allowed white voters to substantially negate African-
American voting power).
75. See Shaw, 509 U.S. at 637-51; RusH & ENGSTROM, supra note 42, at 19; David M.
Guinn, et al., Redistricting in 2001 and Beyond: Navigating the Narrow Channel Between
the Equal Protection Clause and the Voting Rights Act, 5t BAYLOR L. REV. 225, 228 (1999)
(discussing how racial gerrymander claim can arise if legislature does not consider tradi-
tional districting principles); see also RICHARD K. SCIER LET AL., VOTING Ric;n's AND
DEMOCRACY: THE LAW AND POLITICS ov DtSTRICTING 149, 153, 155-167 (1997). "Conti-
guity" refers to district where all territory within the district is part of the district. Id. "A
district is contiguous if it is possible from any part of the district to reach any other part
without crossing the boundary." Id. "Compactness" refers to districts that are closely
packed and orderly. Id. The phrase "political subdivisions" refers to areas, such as coun-
ties or sub-state regions, that can be grouped together or separately. Id. Last, a "commu-
nity of interest" is a phrase that incorporates the culture, history, and tradition, and even
geography, of a group of people in a geographical area. Id. These are some factors that
legislators will consider during redistricting, but opponents to majority-minority districts
claim that these factors are not considered and that majority-minority districts are given an
unconstitutional exception. Id.
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F. Seminal Cases of Current Majority-Minority Districting Law: Shaw
I, Miller, and Shaw II
Arguably the most significant civil rights bill ever passed, the VRA has
brought in a flood of criticism. 76 In 1993, the Court, in Shaw v. Reno
(Shaw I), transformed its doctrinal analysis of voting rights by applying
strict scrutiny.77 Essentially, the Court held that race-based districting
was no different from any other type. Moreover, this new reasoning
spurred a mass of cases filed by White complainants challenging majority-
minority districts under the Fourteenth Amendment, citing the Equal
Protection Clause.78 The plaintiffs only had "the burden to show, either
through circumstantial evidence of a district's shape and demographics or
more direct evidence going to legislative purpose, that race was the pre-
dominant factor motivating the legislature's decision to place a significant
number of voters within and without a particular district., 79 The plain-
tiffs, unlike minority plaintiffs alleging violations under Section 2, did not
have to prove actual harm. 0 Rather, they had to prove only that "dilu-
tive [racial] gerrymandering . . . [had] harmed a set of districts in that
their group's opportunity to elect candidates of its choice [is] negatively
affected by the district boundaries."8"
The Shaw decision held that raced-based districting was the same as
other types of discriminating State action, 2 and that decision was carried
over into the companion case of Shaw v. Hunt (Shaw 11).83
76. Donovan L. Wickline, Note, Walking a Tightrope: Redrawing Congressional Dis-
trict Lines After Shaw v. Reno and its Progeny, 25 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 641, 652 (1998); c.f
Laughlin McDonald, The Counterrevolution in Minority Voting Rights, 65 Miss. L. J. 271,
273-74 (1995) (arguing that Shaw and the cases following will undo the gains that have
been made in minority voting).
77. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
78. See Shaw, 509 U.S. at 643, 658 (discussing racial gerrymandering under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); accord Guinn, et al., supra note 75 at
230.
79. RUSH & ENGSTROM, supra note 42, at 18 (discussing the extension of the Shaw
doctrine in Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995)); see also Sue T. Gilgore, Between the
Devil and the Deep Blue Sea: Courts, Legislatures, and Majority-Minority Districts, 46
CATH. U.L. REV. 1299, 1305 (1997) (discussing the "predominant factor standard" articu-
lated in Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995)).
80. RUSH & ENGSTROM, supra note 42, at 16.
81. Id. at 16; c.f 3 MARSHA J. TYSON DARLING, RACE, VOTING, REDISTRICING AND
THE CONSTITUTION: ALTERNATE RE-DISTRIC.TING, REGISTERING, AND VOTING SYSTEMS 24
(2001) ("Any elections depending on districts is subject to gerrymandering and dilution of
a minority group's voting power.").
82. DARLING, supra note 81, at 265.
83. Wickline, supra note 76, at 652; c.f McDonald, supra note 76, at 273-74.
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Initially, the States decided issues of whether or not to create majority-
minority districts.8 4 For the most part, the Supreme Court appeared dis-
interested. Specifically, it reasoned that under the Equal Protection
Clause, no injury existed for plaintiffs who claimed that race was the gov-
erning factor in the creation of new majority-minority districts.8 5 The
irony within Shaw 1, however, was that the issue of whether a majority-
minority district actually violated the rights of the predominately White
community was never argued.86 Shaw I was based primarily on the shape
of the majority-minority districts.8 7 The irony is two-fold: (1) plaintiffs
have generally brought voting rights claims to redress minority griev-
ances; and (2) the action was not brought under Section 2 of the VRA.8"
Section 2 requirements would be almost impossible to prove for White
plaintiffs. Instead, White plaintiffs presented their constitutional chal-
lenge "under 42 U.S.C § 1983, which provides that any person [acting
under color of] any statute that causes deprivation of any right secured by
the Constitution is liable to the injured party in law or equity. '' s9
Following Shaw I, the Court faced another equal protection challenge
brought by White plaintiffs in Miller v. Johnson."0 Miller, like Shaw I and
I, was decided under a strict scrutiny standard.9 The Supreme Court
reasoned that the district had been created with race as the predominant
overriding factor and the district had not been "narrowly tailored to serve
the state's compelling interest." 92 "Litigation by White voters, following
Shaw [I] and Miller, raise[ed] the odd situation in which a state that [had]
previously been cited for discriminatory practices against minority voters
[had to] show a compelling state interest to draw [majority-minority] dis-
tricts for [minority] voters." 93
84. Wickline, supra note 76, at 650.
85. Id. at 651; accord CHRISTOPHER M. BURKE, THE APPEARANCE OF EQUALITry: RA-
CIAL GERRYMANDERING. REDISTRiCrING, AND THE SUPREME COURT 92 (1999) ("Since
Thornburg v. Gingles, the VRA had contemplated the race-conscious drawing of single-
member districts to remedy the persistence of racial bloc voting.").
86. SCHER ET AL., supra note 75, at 94.
87. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 633-34.
88. SCHER ET AL., supra note 75, at 182.
89. Id. at 183. White plaintiffs need only show that race was a predominant factor,
circumventing the requirements that would have to be used if a complaint was brought
under Section 2. id.
90. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 904 (1995) (discussing Fourteenth Amendment
challenge to Southern District of Georgia's congressional redistricting plan).
91. TINSLEY E. YARBROUGH, RACE AND REDISTRRICrING: THE SHAW-CROMARTIE
CASES 141 (Peter C. Hoffer & N.E.H. Hull eds., 2002).
92. Id.
93. SC'||R ET AL., supra note 75, at 183.
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In Miller, proponents of a majority-minority district, admittedly cre-
ated through racial gerrymander, argued on appeal to the Supreme Court
that "under Shaw I a racially motivated district was subject to strict scru-
tiny only if its shape was so bizarre that it was unexplainable on any basis
other than race."94 In a five to four decision, the Supreme Court dis-
agreed. Writing for the Court, Justice Anthony Kennedy stated:
The essence of the equal protection claim recognized in Shaw [I] is
that the State has used race for separating voters into districts. Just
as the State may not, absent extraordinary justification, segregate cit-
izens [into different voting districts] on the basis of race in public
[facilities], so did we recognize in Shaw [I] that it may not separate
its citizens into different voting districts on the basis of race ...
When the State assigns voters on the basis of race, it engages in the
offensive and demeaning assumption that voters of a particular race,
because of their race, 'think alike, share the same political interests,
and will prefer the same candidates at the polls'. 5
Despite Justice Kennedy's interpretation, this was not how the Court
decided Shaw L96 Shaw I held that a district's shape, combined with
other factors, could give rise to an equal protection claim. 97 Thus, the
Miller and Shaw decisions leave much to be desired because they seem to
cut off all avenues for State legislation to ensure that its minority citizens
have a fair vote. Although majority-minority districting seemed to be a
straightforward remedy,98 increasing litigation by White voters essentially
ousted the potential remedies offered by the VRA. 99
94. YARBROUGH, supra note 91, at 140: c.f Richard Briffault, Race and Representa-
tion After Miller v. Johnson, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 23, 45 (1995) ("If shape is the crucial
factor, the legislature may engage in race-conscious districting, rely on its own stereotypes
concerning racial voting behavior, and create districts dominated by one race or another-
and surely an elected politician will understand his or her district's racial demographics
even if the general public is less informed-so long as the legislature uses traditionally
shaped districts that leave the public blissfully ignorant of the legislature's intentional use
of race.").
95. YARBROUGH, supra note 91, at 140.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Bernard Grofman, Would Vince Lombardi Have Been Right If He Had Said:
"When it Comes To Redistricting, Race Isn't Everything, It's the Only Thing?", 14 CAR-
D~OZO L. REV. 1237, 1245 (1993).
99. BRUCE E. CAIN, VOTING RIGHTS ANDI DEMOCRATIC THEORY: TOWARD A
COLOR-BLIND SOCIETY?, reprinted in CONTROVERSIES IN MINORIrY VOTING. THE VOTING
Rii-rrs Acr IN PERSPICriVE 270 (Bernard Grofman & Chandler Davidson eds., 1992).
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Supporters of Shaw I and decisions following believe that the decisions
have been glorified.'0° They state that Shaw should be viewed "as a judi-
cial effort to draw the highly contestable line that plagues all civil rights
policies, the line between . . . 'nondiscrimination' and 'affirmative ac-
tion'."' tl They contend that minorities "do not have to be represented by
their own kind to be well represented.' 102 Rather, they claim that the
only effect the remedial voting measure has is that it allows some racial
and ethnic groups to have special representational advantages, which in
turn fosters racial tensions. 0 3 Essentially, creating majority-minority dis-
tricts for the sake of racial justice will not increase voter representation.
It will only limit the ways in which minorities may be represented.'0 4 This
type of limitation would defy American democratic voting because only
certain types of candidates would be allowed to compete.t0 5
Opponents of majority-minority districts further contend that the true
purpose behind Section 2 of the VRA was to prevent discriminatory vot-
ing practices from causing dilution of the minority vote. 10 6 The way the
VRA has been implemented and enforced, however, may undercut the
benefits by creating lasting ethnic divisions. 107 [The VRA] "promote[s]
excessive factionalism by further encouraging racial and ethnic group
identities [because] ... laws bestow political or material advantages upon
people because they belong to a particular demographic group, the mere
condition of belonging may acquire greater political significance than it
would otherwise."'0 8 Minorities and the legislatures presumed that ma-
jority-minority districts were constitutional.° 9 But the counter argument
100. Richard H. Pildes, Group Conflict and the Constitution: Race, Sexuality, and Re-
ligion: Principled Limitations on Racial and Partisan Redistricting, 106 YALE L. J. 2505,
2509-10 (1997) (claiming -the Shaw doctrine is neither a broad attack on Section 2 of the
VRA nor an assault on all intentional race-conscious districting").
101. Id. at 2510.
102. CAIN, supra note 99, at 265.
103. Id. at 267.
104. Id. at 266.
105. Id. at 267. The Court presented the problem as if only racial issues cause fraction-
alization within districts. In POLITICAL GERRYMANDERING AND THE COURTS, however,
Grofman discusses how fractionalization occurs within districts when Republicans and
Democrats manipulate districting in order to "compact" or "fracture" constituencies based
on the number of votes needed to win an election.
106. CAIN, supra note 99, at 273; see also T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Samuel Is-
sacharoff, Race and Redistricting: Drawing Constitutional Lines After Shaw v. Reno, 92
MICH. L. Rhv. 588, 588 (discussing political agendas of incumbents when redrawing district
lines).
107. CAIN, supra note 99, at 269 (Bernard Grofman & Chandler Davidson eds., 1992).
108. Id. at 270.
109. See Johnson v. Degrandy 512 U.S. 997, 1024 (1994) (upholding a districting plan
that allowed for a Hispanic and Black majority-minority district).
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is that they are actually a benign form of racial discrimination. Nothing
in Section 2 of the VRA entitled racial minorities to proportional repre-
sentation.1 ° Now, State legislation finds itself in a bind because it creates
majority-minority districts to avoid litigation under Section 2 of the VRA,
while at the same time trying to avoid litigation from minorities under the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
It is under this umbrella of precedents that Texas Republicans and
Democrats may have to formulate their respective arguments. It is al-
most definite that an appeal will be made to the Supreme Court regard-
less of who wins because the federal ruling will have an extreme impact
on the national stance of Republicans and Democrats. The likely flaw to
appear in both parties strategies is the assumption that their minority
constituencies, namely the Hispanic and African-American voters, will
vote in a predictable fashion and only use the tool of minority aggrega-
tion as a remedial measure.
III. "TURNING AND TURNING IN THE WIDENING GYRE""ll:
DEMOCRATIC/REPUBLICAN AGENDA IN TEXAS
President Bush should hope that the courts rescue him from going
down in history as the president whose Justice Department gutted the
Voting Rights Act and sacrificed up to 3.6 million minority Texans.112
Two conclusions may be drawn from the fight between Texas Demo-
crats and Republicans: 1) the fight is not about protecting minority voting
rights, even though some will argue otherwise; and 2) the fight need not
impede the expansion of minority voting rights.
In sum, the fight is a classic power struggle, but in this scenario, Demo-
crats stand to lose the most. 113 Texas Democrats already lost one battle
110. YARBROUGH, supra note 91, at 1.
111. William Butler Yeats, The Second Coming, at http://www.well.com/userleob/
poetryrFheSecondComing.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2004).
112. Robert T. Garrett & Pete Slover, Agency Backs Remap: Court Could Still Reject
GOP Play Approved bv Justice Department, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Dec. 19, 2003, avail-
able at http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dallas/washington/topstory/stories/1220
03dntexremap.1116a.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2004). This statement was made by Martin
Frost, currently the Democratic U.S. Representative for Arlington, after he learned that
the Department of Justice had approved the new districting map proposed by the Republi-
cans. Id. Frost's constituency, District 24, is one of the main districts that will be disman-
tled if the current map is allowed to stand. Id.
113. Associated Press, Colorado Court Rules Redistricting Unconstitutional, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Dec. 1, 2003, http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dallas/nation/sto-
ries/120103dnnatredistricting.5c8ada.html (last visited Aug. 22, 2004) (on file with author).
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when the Fifth Circuit found mid-decade remapping lawful.t1 4 Demo-
crats had first used the argument that mid-census redistricting was illegal.
The second argument pointed directly to the VRA. What better way to
make a strong statement than to play the race card? It was a strategic
move by the Texas Democrats.
First, the move immediately halted any action the Republican Party
might make while the case was pending.' t 5 Second, by incorporating a
federal statute, the Texas Democrats circumvented any hindrances that
the Texas Constitution might impose. Accordingly, the next phase for
Republicans and Democrats is to prepare legal arguments that will with-
stand Shaw I and its progeny.
A. Doctrinal Context: The Voting Rights Act Revisited
The Democrats should argue strictly on the merits of Section 2 of the
VRA and contend that the new map is racial gerrymandering. Under
Section 2, the Democrats need only show that the minority vote will be
affected. Presenting such evidence should not be a problem. For exam-
ple, the new map splits District 24-what was a prime source of African-
American votes for Democrats-and divides its parts among Republican
territory.1 6 The result is that a once strongly Democratic district, repre-
sented by African-American voters, is now predominantly Republican."1 7
Although Republicans are quick to point out that District 24 is the only
district that is severely affected by the new map, outside of this, their
argument is weak. The effects of the remap may not be substantial.
Nonetheless, they appear sufficient to call into question Section 2 of the
VRA.
First, Democrats should turn directly to the Shaw doctrine. Specifi-
cally, they should contend that the new map was designed strictly on the
basis of race-i.e., Republicans took note of the large minority popula-
114. Garrett & Slover, supra note 112; accord Robert T. Garrett, Panel: Mid-decade
Redistricting OK Under State Law, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Dec. 19, 2003, available at
http://www.txcn.com/sharedcontent/dallas/politics/state/stories/121903dntexredistricting.
ba0ca3ac.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2004) (discussing the federal court's ruling that legisla-
tive redistricting has not been proven to be illegal).
115. Slover, supra note 10 ("The redistricting case [is] actually a number of cases
rolled into one.").
116. Gromer Jeffers, Jr., Road to D.C. Depends on Remap, DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
Dec. 16, 2003, available at http://www.txcn.com/sharedcontent/dallas/politics/columnists/
gjeffers/stories/121603dnmetjeffers.a72bfcbl.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2004); Slover, supra
note 10.
117. See Slover,supra note 10 (noting that remap has significantly diluted democratic-
minority-vote in District 24).
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tion and formulated a new map based on racial assumptions. Surely these
racial considerations could not pass muster under the Shaw doctrine.
Conversely, Republicans should focus strongly on the VRA cases that
have come before the court in the last decade. These cases are fresh and
immediately identifiable to the current Justices on the Supreme Court.
Furthermore, the trend now seems to be leaning toward invalidating any-
thing that appears to rely heavily on affirmative action."I s The Republi-
cans can make a case for the previous map to be an affirmative action
measure that handicaps minority voters by assuming they will all vote in
harmony.
The possible arguments of racial gerrymandering and unneeded affirm-
ative action are viable. But both parties are assuming that majority-mi-
nority districts will continue to vote in a predictable fashion-the
predictable fashion being minorities for Democrats and non-minorities
for Republicans. In light of national developments, these assumptions
appear flawed.11 9
B. The Element of Surprise: Using the Growing Unpredictability in
Voting Patterns As a Weapon Against the Political Pigeonhole
In California, Cruz Bustamante lost the gubernatorial special election
to Arnold Schwarzenegger. 120 The irony of the election loss centers on
the fact that 1) Bustamante is the Democratic grandson of Mexican immi-
grants and is currently the Lieutenant Governor of California; 2) Califor-
nia is a Democratic State in which Democratic candidates generally win
70 percent of the Hispanic vote; and 3) Arnold Schwarzenegger is a
White Republican immigrant who sits on the board of the U.S. English
organization-an organization that believes English should be the official
language of the United States.1 21
The campaign results were further shocking because polls revealed that
while 65 percent of African-Americans voted for Bustamante, only 52
118. E.g., Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 275-76 (2003) (invalidating the undergrad-
uate admissions policy that made race a dominating factor).
119. Over 40 percent of Hispanics voted for Republican Arnold Schwarzenegger or
Tom McClintock, the Republican Senator. Kathryn Jean L6pez, Independence Day, Hisp.,
Dec. 2003, at 24-25 (interpreting the result of the California gubernatorial election out-
come in how it represents the changing dynamic of Hispanic politics). Ironically, neither
candidate made an attempt to attract the Hispanic vote, assuming the Democrats already
held it. Id. Contra, James G. Gimpel, Losing Ground or Staying Even?: Republicans and
the Politics of the Latino Vote, BACKGROUNDER (Ctr. for Immigration Studies), Oct. 2004,
at I ("Latinos have remained remarkably stable in their political views, preferring Demo-
crats over Republicans by a margin of two to one nationally and in most states.").
120. L6pez, supra note 119, at 24-25.
121. Id.
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percent of Hispanics voted for him.' 2 2 Furthermore, Bustamante ran his
campaign primarily on the basis that he was Hispanic. 123 Many theories
were espoused as to why Bustamante lost the election, such as his past as
a racial separatist, but the end result was that Hispanics will not be politi-
cally pigeonholed just because they are Hispanic.' 24
In Washington D.C. four Hispanic congressmen have left the Demo-
cratic Congressional Hispanic Caucus and created Republican Congres-
sional Hispanic Conference. The Congressional Hispanic Conference was
formed in March 2003 because the founding members felt the Congres-
sional Hispanic Caucus only supported Hispanics if the Hispanics sup-
ported liberal politics.' 25  The change in politics should not be so
surprising. It is inevitable that the growth of the Hispanic population
would lead to broadening of political views. On the other hand, African-
Americans are content to remain predominately Democratic. Their bat-
tle is not so much political, as it is a battle to maintain the political power
that has been gained over the years-a losing proposition if African-
Americans continue their exodus out of predominately African-Ameri-
can districts.
Furthermore, Hispanic voters are a far more diverse majority than
other minorities. 126 Their vote is not reliably Democratic, and they are
more than willing to join forces with Republicans if the platform fits their
needs. 127 The immense potential for diversity in the Hispanic population
is reflected by its response to the 2000 census. t 28 At least 50 percent of
Hispanics viewed themselves as Mayan, Mestizo, or Tejano.129 This type
122. Id. at 25.
123. Id. at 24.
124. Id. at 25 (claiming that Hispanics are not necessarily supporting Republicans but
are looking for representation that did not come from within California, which has been
viewed as politically corrupt).
125. Kathryn Jean L6pez, Power Struggle, Hisp., July/Aug. 2003, available at http://
www.hispaniconline.com/magazine/2003/july-aug/Features/power.html (last visited Oct. 29,
2004). The founding members of the Congressional Hispanic Conference are Henry
Bonilla (R-TX), Lincoln Diaz-Balart (R-FL), Mario Diaz-Balart (R-FL), and Ileana Ros-
Lehtinen (R-FL). Id. The issue that caused the separation concerned the Hispanic Caucus'
refusal to support confirmation of Miguel Estrada, a Bush nominee, to serve on the Dis-
trict of Columbia Court of Appeals. Id.
126. Mireya Navarro, Going Beyond Black and White, Hispanics in Census Pick
'Other', N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2003, at Al. In the 2000 census, forty-eight percent of His-
panic-respondents identified themselves as white. Two percent of Hispanic-respondents
identified themselves as African-American. Id.
127. Maria Elena Salinas, California Dreaming, Hisp., Dec. 2003, at 26. For example,
in October 2003, 46 percent of Hispanics approved the removal of Democrat Gray Davis,
then-governor of California. Id.
128. Navarro, supra note 126, at Al.
129. Id.
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of diverse identification likely spreads the Hispanic vote in a myriad of
political areas, even outside of the Democrat-Republican dichotomy.
Stated differently, Hispanics are cohesive by their Spanish language, not
by their politics.' 3 °
This type of unpredictability is a tool that can continue to keep politi-
cians guessing. It is also a tool that can be used to combine Hispanic and
African-American political power. A Hispanic and African-American
coalition could change and manipulate the political arena because neither
Republicans nor Democrats could use -the groups as predictable pawns to
add to poll statistics.
C. De Facto Aggregation: State Action Need Not Apply
We were ahead of our time. The Latino community in the 1970s and
'80s was neither a threat nor an asset to the African-American commu-
nity. We can talk about idealism, but that's why coalitions are
formed-f[by a] threat or [by] the possibility of a gain. I think we are
both [a threat and an asset] now. 131
Majority-minority districts affected by the new map should not aggre-
gate to mount an appeal against the federal court's ruling. Rather, mi-
norities should strive to create an influential minority coalition without
the State becoming involved.
Twenty years ago, The National Council of La Raza, a non-profit or-
ganization, pushed for a Hispanic and African-American coalition as a
way to combine power and have a strong political presence. 132 According
to Raul Yzaguirre, the president of the organization, the attempted coali-
tion failed due to a lack of support in the African-American commu-
nity. 133 Other attempts at an African-American and Hispanic coalition,
however, have been successful.
During the 1998 Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, the Mexican
American Legal Defense and Education Fund (MALDEF), the National
Urban League, the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People (NAACP), and the National Council of La Raza (NCLR)
130. Tim Chavez, Rethinking Diversity: End the Racial Spoils System and Bring On
True Empowerment, Hisl., Dec. 2003, at 80 (discussing the growth of the Hispanic popula-
tion and the self-segregation of Hispanics and African-Americans in defeat of trying to
find common ground); accord Salinas, supra note 127, at 26 ("[The] Hispanic vote is not
homogenous. Even if most are Democrats, there is a difference between the way the more
loyal native-born Hispanics vote and the more swayable naturalized citizens.").
131. Megan Twohey, Role Reversal Jolts Blacks, Hispanics, 33 NAT'L J. 1122 (2001)
(quoting Raul Yzaguirre, president of the National Council of La Raza).
132. Id.
133. Id.
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joined to make certain that Hispanics and African-Americans would be
accurately counted during the 2000 census. 134 African-Americans and
Hispanics have even come together to demand more representations of
minorities on major television networks. 35 The down side to this para-
digm, however, is that once a goal is reached for one group the other does
not continue to lend as much support, and the result is tension that shat-
ters the coalition's cohesiveness.' 36 What is on the political, social, or
economic agenda for African-American leaders does not always equate
to what is a top priority for Hispanic leaders, and vice-versa. Yzaguirre
expresses the idea that, "[i]n the competition for jobs, there's a sense that
the gatekeepers for minorities are Black, that affirmative action and di-
versity officers as well as the community affairs folks in government, busi-
ness and nonprofit sectors are all African-American."
1 37
While the agenda may be different for both races on a variety of issues,
it is the political sector that will feel the most tension from the idea that
African-Americans are "minority gatekeepers."' 38 In the past, the His-
panic voter bloc has been dubbed the "sleeping giant"'139 because it has
not always flexed its political muscle. But the enormous growth of the
Hispanic population within the last decade has caused Republicans to in-
tensely pursue the Hispanic vote, and caused Democrats to use immigra-
tion to significantly increase its voting-base.'
40
The huge population growth of Hispanics would seem to equal more
political power, especially during voting,1 4 and is a reason why so many
134. Id.
135. Twohey, supra note 131, at 1122; see also Kathryn Jones, The New, New Henry
C., TEXAS MONTHLY, July 2000, at 47 (discussing how large companies such as AT&T,
MCI, and MSN are spending enormous amounts of money to advertise in Hispanic
markets).
136. Twohey, supra note 131, at 1122.
137. Id.
138. Matthew I. Pinzur, Looking for a Better Choice: Latinos Are Playing a Key Role
in Promoting School Voucher Programs, Hisp., Dec. 2003, at 29 (expressing that Hispanics
and African-Americans face the challenge of dealing with urban neighborhoods and low
school performance).
139. Kathleen Conti, Push on to Increase City's Latino Vote Ballot Question, Races
Spur Interest, BOSTON GLOBE, Sep. 5, 2002, at 6.
140. See James G. Gimpel & Karen Kaufmann, Impossible Dream or Distant Reality?:
Republican Efforts to Attract Latino Voters, BACKGROUNDER (Ctr. for Immigration Stud-
ies) Aug. 2001, at 1 ("Democrats lead Republicans by a comfortable margin in the partisan
identification of Latino voters. The gap is wider among immigrant Latinos who have not
yet become citizens.").
141. David R. Ayon, A New Way of Cutting Up the Pie: Skilled Management Will Be
Needed to Mitigate Potential Conflict as Mexicans and Other Latin Americans Challenge
African-Americans at the Voting Booth, L.A. TiMLS, Apr. 10, 1994, at 23.
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Hispanic leaders have promoted citizenship.' 42 Unfortunately, this is not
always the case. The redistricting and the 2001 elections seemed to indi-
cate Hispanics lack the political clout carried by African-Americans. 43
The problem is Hispanic voters in states with a high Hispanic population,
like California and Texas, are geographically more dispersed than Afri-
can-Americans.""' Hispanics face the challenge of harnessing their politi-
cal power, while African-Americans risk losing their political power if
they refuse to join with other minority groups.
African-Americans seem to be blind to the political growth of Hispan-
ics.145 Possibly, African-Americans are still focused on their political bat-
tles with mainstream White America.'46 The criticism is that the African-
American-White paradigm is no longer a meritorious concept in the polit-
ical debates.t47 If anything, it is a hindrance to other minorities in the
country who receive little attention because of the belief that African-
Americans are the oppressed group."4 ' Other critics argue that the issue
is not only moot, but should be replaced by a multicultural view.' 4 9 For
example, Deborah Ramirez, in her article, Multicultural Empowerment:
It's Not Just Black and White Anymore, states:
Creating a multiracial category would dilute the statistical strength of
established minority groups. As the number of people claiming mul-
tiracial identity increases, membership in existing minority groups
would necessarily decrease. This statistical change would have an
enormous impact on matters immensely important to minority com-
munities: electoral representation, the allocation of governmental
benefits, affirmative action, and federal contracting rules.15 0
142. Id.
143. Richard E. Cohen, Hispanic Hope Fades, 34 NAT'L J. 1, 1 (2002).
144. Kim Geron & James S. Lai, Beyond Symbolic Representation: A Comparison of
the Electoral Pathways and Policy Priorities of Asian American and Latino Elected Offi-
cials, 9 ASIAN L.J. 41, 46 (2002).
145. But see James G. Gimpel, Latinos and the 2002 Election: Republicans Do Well
When Latinos Stay Home, BACKGROUNDER (Ctr. for Immigration Studies), Jan. 2003, at 1.
"There is no 'Latino' voting bloc, as such-after controlling for party identification, in-
come, and education, there is no difference between Latino voting and the voting pattern
of non-Hispanic whites.... This is not true of African Americans, who are a distinctive
voting bloc .. " Id.
146. Symposium: Multicultural Empowerment: It's Not Just Black and White Anymore,
47 STAN. L. REV. 957, 960 (1995) [hereinafter Multicultural Empowerment].
147. Rachel F. Moran, Neither Black Nor White, 2 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 61, 68-69
(1997).
148. Id.
149. Multicultural Empowerment, supra note 146, at 960.
150. Id. at 968.
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Neither Hispanics nor African-Americans desire that their individual
voices become diluted. For example, African-Americans have begun to
separate themselves from different cultures. 5 ' Over the last decade
there has been an increase in enrollment for Historically African-Ameri-
can Colleges and Universities, in African-American-owned businesses,
and in "spiritually rejuvenated black boulevards of urban America." 5 2
There has also been an extensive intra-metropolitan movement to leave
the inner cities. 53 This deliberate self-segregation of African-Americans
may result in diluting the political clout that exists because the movement
away from these cities has decreased African-Americans' political impact
on traditional African-American districts. 54 It may also lead to pitting
African-Americans against Hispanics, instead of using Hispanic-growth
as an added power against unfair politics.
55
On the other hand, Hispanic populations have grown at a much faster
rate than African-American populations and are more geographically
concentrated in certain states. 1 5 6 As one commentator notes, "It is inevi-
table that [Hispanic] electoral representation will increase .... The most
important question then is how will greater [Hispanic] electoral represen-
tation be achieved? Will it be achieved at the expense of African Ameri-
cans or at the expense of white progressive elected officials?" 1 57 In sum,
how Hispanics and African-Americans interact in the future will deter-
mine the success of minority coalitions and the Republican and Demo-
cratic agendas.
IV. CONCLUSION
Texas Republicans and Democrats have laid the path for the U.S. Su-
preme Court. If the Republican redistricting map is upheld, the Supreme
Court may be implying that affirmative-action measures for minorities
are becoming obsolete. If the Supreme Court sides with Texas Demo-
crats, it may be indicating that minority issues are still a talisman that can
manipulate politics at any political party's whim. Either way, Hispanic
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152. Id.
153. Symposium: Panel I: New Demographics and the Voting Rights Act: Making the
Voting Rights Act Relevant to the New Demographics of America: A Response to Farrell and
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Rights Act].
154. Id.
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fies the Melting Pot of the 1990s, BOSTON GLOBE, Sep. 17, 1997, at Al.
156. New Demographics and the Voting Rights Act, supra note 153, at 1286.
157. Id.
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and African-American voters are not required to fall in line with the role
Republicans and Democrats want them to play. Minorities do not have
to act as a single-dimensional voting tool that can be swayed solely on the
basis of a candidate's cultural background. Moreover, minorities possess
the power to come together as they choose and segregate as they see fit.
They may voluntarily aggregate as a proactive measure rather than a re-
medial measure that falls under the multi-interpreted strictures of Section
2. In other words, their political future need not depend on whether the
U.S. Supreme Court will uphold the elimination of majority-minority
districts.
